Again and again throughout the history of Christian thought theological apologetics has dissolved the great ironic paradox of Jesus Christ into binary oppositions. In these historical contexts cultural relevancy has prevailed, and the underlying philosophical ideology has generated a disastrous subversion of the apologentic formulations of Christology in the New Testament. By calling this dichotomization into question, this essay intends to promote a postmodern hermeneutics that preserves the christological paradox and orients the constituting consciousness of theologians and scholars to both a spirituality of "being-affected by" the biblical witness to Jesus Christ and a faith that will initiate action toward the transformation of society.
1.
Introduction The dialectics of Western philosophy have structured the ambiguities of human existence as polar opposites and constituted a kind of ontological pollution system: being vs. appearance, soul vs. body, mind vs. matter, identity vs. difference, nature vs. culture, good vs. evil, presence vs. absence, speech vs. writing, life vs. death. The two terms in each binarity, however, are not regarded as equal entities. As Jacques Derrida has shown, the second term of each pair is generally viewed negatively as an inferior reality, something to be overcome, possibly by a third entity or synthesis. 1 Characteristic of the history of Christian thought is a similar inclination toward the dichotomization of paradox. This has been especially true of the confessional formulations of Christology, which have been adopted by the Church either in accommodation with or in reaction to a particular philosophical orientation. More recently it has been evident in biblical scholarship's quest of the historical Jesus. The New Testament's presentation of the paradoxical unity of Jesus Christ has been dissolved into a set of polarized realities: Jesus versus the Christ, or the Christ against Jesus. The one, either Jesus or the Christ, is considered to be superior to the other, and consequently is theologically or philosophically dogmatized as the basis of Christian faith.
What is the christological truth of the Christian faith? Is it the reality of Jesus alone, apart from any and every christological attribution of deity? Is it the divine reality of the Christ, whose relationship with the physical nature of Jesus of Nazareth was nothing more than a temporary conjunction or even an illusion? Or is it the ongoing confessional activity of interpreting Jesus as the Christ eschatologically and soterio-logically on the basis of his resurrection from the dead?
Of these three alternatives, the first two have tended to be predominant throughout the history of Christian thought, and with them their attendant conceptions of salvation. The third, however, which unites the Christ title -even in all its historical variations -with Jesus of Nazareth in an acknowledgement of a pioneering conjunction of heaven and earth, of the divine and the human, is the great paradox which the New Testament promotes.
Nevertheless, already twenty-five years after the beginning of the Christian movement Christians in the city of Corinth were differentiating between Jesus and the Christ on the basis of a proto-gnostic orientation. Apparently in their view Jesus was only the physical bearer of the Christ. Since material reality, including the human body of flesh and blood, is subject to the capricious and unstable forces of Fortune, Jesus was to be cursed, while the spiritual reality of the Christ, which transcended the material world, was to be worshipped and praised. Salvation was mediated by spiritual participation in Christ's transcendence and manifested itself above all in the gift of glossolalia. The binary opposition, which these Corinthians had constituted, is implied in the Apostle Paul's refutation of 1 Cor 12:3, "No one speaking by the Spirit of God says, 'Jesus anathema!' or 'Jesus be damned!' And no one is able to say 'Jesus is Lord' except by the Holy Spirit." 
2.
Early Christologizing in a Context of Oppositional Dualism In the following centuries the problem of the union of Jesus and the Christ absorbed theologians, philosophers, and ecclesiastics in a seemingly interminable dispute to resolve once for all what nature of deity could be attributed to the humanity of Jesus, and what nature of humanity could be attributed to the deity of the Christ. If Jesus was the Christ, God's Son, how real was his humanity? On the other hand, if God alone is unbegotten and eternal, and everything else belongs to God's creative activity including the Son, what kind of deity is attributable to Jesus? 3 Virtually everyone who theologized out of a Platonic or Neo-Platonic perspective formulated a christology that was more or less self-contradictory and, if measured by New Testament criteria, heretical. Middle Platonism conditioned the religious philosophy of Origen while Neo-Platonism molded both sides of the Arian-Athanasian controversy that the Council of Nicea and its Nicene Creed attempted to resolve. Presupposed was the metaphysical reality of an unbridgeable chasm separating God, the One, from the created order of the Many. If, therefore, Jesus is the Christ, on which side of this rift did he originate?
Origen (185-254 C.E.) of Alexandria -and later Caesarea -formulated the first comprehensive synthesis of biblical revelation and Middle Platonism. It was a religious philosophy that, like the thought of Philo of Alexandria, attempted to integrate the Scriptures with Greek philosophy and proved to be equally contradictory. God, the One, is self-existent and eternal, but becomes Manifold through the agency of the Logos. Engendered by the One, the Logos shares in the essence of God. As Jn 1:1 declares, the Logos is qeo,j (God); or, in the words of Heb 1:3, the Son is "the radiance of God's glory and the representation of God's essence (hypostasis)." For Origen the Logos is the Son, and the Son is the Logos: "In the Logos one may see the Son, and because He is in the Father He may be said to be in the beginning." 4 As the Logos the Son is "homoousios tô patri" (the same substance with the Father).
5
Consequently, on the one hand, there never was a time when there was no Son or Logos. That is, there never was a time when God was without Consciousness or Wisdom. 6 Yet because God's consciousness or wisdom is not identical to God, the Logos is only qeo,j, not o` qeo,j (the God).
7
"One might assert, and with reason, that God Himself is the beginning of all things, and might go on to say, as is plain, that the Father is the beginning of the Son; and the demiurge the beginning of the works of the demiurge, and that God in a word is the beginning of all that exists." 8 "For if human beings are according to the image, but the image according to the Father; in the first case the Father is the h` avrch, of Christ, and in the other Christ is the avrch, of human beings, and human beings are made, not according to that of which He is the image, but according to the image." 9 "But Christ is demiurge as a beginning (avrch,), inasmuch as He is wisdom. It is in virtue of his being wisdom that he is called avrch,. For Wisdom says in Solomon, "God created me the beginning of His ways, for His works," so that the Logos might be in an avrch,, namely in wisdom."
10
Obviously for Origen, "Logos," "the Son," "Christ," "demiurge," "wisdom" or "Sophia," and "arche" are synonymous terms that refer to one and the same reality, God.
11 But not the God, with the definite article denoting the "Father" or, as Jesus refers to this supreme Being in Jn 17:3, "the only true God". The Logos, the Son, Christ, as the demiurge, is the "archetypal image … who was in the beginning, and who by being with God is at all times God, not possessing that of himself, but by his being with the Father…"
As the being who stands between the One and the Many, neither uncreated as God nor created as the spiritual and physical worlds, the Logos is "the other or second God" (deuteron theon). In as far as he comprehends in himself all the forms of creation, he is God's "first cause".
14 As Harnack expresses it, "He is already the first stage of the transition from the One to the Manifold, and, as the medium of the world-idea, his essence has an inward relation to the world, which is itself without beginning." 15 Origen builds the paradox on Jn 1:1.
"First, that the Logos was in the beginning, as if he was by himself and not with anyone, and secondly, that he was in the beginning with God. And I consider that there is nothing untrue in saying of him both that he was in the beginning, and in the beginning with God, for neither was he with God alone, since he was also in the beginning, nor was he in the beginning alone and not with God, since 'He was in the beginning with God.'"
16
Because the Logos, by comprehending all the forms of creation, has "an inward relation to the world," he does not bear the unchangeable nature of God. He is a manifestation of deity, but in as far as he is a being that God originated, he is a "hypostasis" and a "demiurge. 17 This ambiguous location of the Logos between the self-existent God and the created world subordinates the Logos to God and consequently, like the cosmology of Philo, constitutes a static hierarchical order.
18
In that static hierarchical order the Holy Spirit is the transition from the Logos to the realm of the ideas and the great diversity of spirits which the Logos created. Human spirits belong to this descending gradation, and, like all created spirits, are preexistent and eternal. But, as a result of the Fall, they have been transformed into souls, incarcerated in material bodies, and subjected to the earthly warfare between angels and demons. Their sojourn on earth is designed to enable them to achieve purification and to return to "the likeness of God," the Logos, from whom they originated.
19
The contagion of sin is also a condition endemic to creation, and expiation is necessary in order to enable human souls to recover their identity as spirits and return to their origin. In accordance with the New Testament, Origen acknowledged Christ as "the incarnation of the Logos" who made expiation for humankind by offering his death as a sacrifice acceptable to God and simultaneously as a ransom paid to the devil. 20 But Christ, according to Origen's Middle Platonism, cannot be a true enfleshment of the Logos, for the Logos cannot unite with matter. Consequently, the incarnation of the Logos was limited to the soul of Jesus, and through the soul with his body.
21
For Origen, however, redemption is essentially a return to union with the Logos, and that requires knowledge. Jesus Christ, therefore, as the limited incarnation of the Logos, is principally a teacher who reveals the depths of that true knowledge which the Eternal Gospel, revealed in the Scriptures, imparts: how human beings can purify themselves and unite with the Logos in order to recover their deity. Eschatology, therefore, determined Origen's soteriology, above all, the eschatology adopted from 1 Cor. 15:28, " … so that God might be all things in all things." 
3.
Arius, Athanasius, and the Nicene Creed Lucian (possibly of Samosata) appropriated Origen's doctrine of the Logos but dissolved its ambiguous relationship with the Godhead. The Logos was not "the same substance (ousia) with the Father." Arius, his most notable student, followed him in identifying the Logos, or the Son, with the created order. If Athanasius' derogatory account of Arius's theology is reliable, Arius believed that the Son was brought into being by God's wisdom, and, therefore, by participating in this Wisdom, the Son is called Wisdom or Logos. 23 Since God cannot generate anything out of God's own essence nor communicate that essence to the creation, the Son cannot participate in God's substance (ousia) and therefore is totally independent of God. God alone is anarchos (without beginning); the Son, in contrast has an arche (beginning), and for Arius that is the beginning of the created order.
"Arius' philosophical presuppositions forced him to assert a difference of ousia between the Father and the Son and to choose the term ktizo (create) as the basic description of the relationship between them. But once having drawn the basic distinction in this way, his aim is to emphasize in the highest possible degree the qualifications which require to be made in the understanding of those basic distinctions." 24 Accordingly, although the Son is to be identified as "a creature, he is not as one of the creatures." 25 For within that qualification he is nevertheless the eivkw,n (image) and avpau,gasma (radiance) of the Father. He served as the demiurge by which the subsequent creation was engendered and in the fullness of time became enfleshed as a human being in Jesus of Nazareth. The salvation that this incarnate Son achieved for human beings is the divine grace of deification identical to that which the Son received from the Father. To quote Maurice Wiles again:
"The soteriological scheme is one for which it is what is 'common to us and to the Son'. His sonship is constituted by his obedience to the Father, by his willing God's will, that enables him to save us into a sonship in the same mode." 26 Athanasius (295-373 C.E.), in opposition to Arius, contended that Jesus as the Christ is on the other side of the rift. 27 He belongs to the Godhead and therefore is independent of the creation. As the Son, he is co-eternal with the Father and of one and the same substance (homoousios) with the Father. Although Athanasius employed the designation, "the Word" or "the Word of God," he rejected Origen's doctrine of the Logos, and therefore did not regard the Word as the agent of creation. 28 God generated the world directly and without any intermediary. But mysteriously and wonderfully, the Christ, as "the fullness of all Being," united with a body of flesh and blood in Mary's womb in order to communicate the divine nature to all human beings. 29 "But he took our body -not just any body, but from a virgin inviolate and incorrupt, who had not known a man: a body pure and without stain from any human intercourse. He, the Almighty, the Artificer of the universe, made a temple for himself in the womb of a virgin: his own body. …Thus, taking a body like our own, because all were subjected to the corruption of death, in his extreme humility he offered his own body to the Father as a victim in death.
Perceiving that corruption could not be abolished otherwise than through death, but also knowing that he himself, the Word, the Son of the Father, could not die, he assumed a mortal body. In this way, united to the Word who is above all, this body was to die for us, and furthermore, made incorruptible by the Word dwelling within it, would have the power by his resurrection to banish corruption for all others as well." 30 This is the nature of salvation which Jesus as the second Person of the Trinity makes possible, and it is this soteriology that is the objective of Athanasius' christology. 31 Yet in spite of the Son's incarnation, there is almost no trace of his humanity in this christology. 32 For as the Christ, Jesus is inseparable from God, and the gift of deification could not be imparted if he did not participate in the unity of the Godhead. In spite of its inherent contradictions, its great virtue, as Harnack professes, was that, unlike the christology of Arius, it promoted "the religious conviction that Christianity is the religion of perfect fellowship with God." 33 It was primarily through Athanasius' influence on his clerical predecessor, Alexander, the bishop of Alexandria, 34 one of the prominent figures at the Council of Nicaea, that the core of his christology was expressed in the doctrinal declaration of the Nicene Creed. 35 This Creed, however, was designed to overcome the cosmological dualism of Gnostic speculation and perhaps also to resolve the ambiguity of the religious philosophy of Origin. 36 God is One! Judaism, New Testament Christianity, even Neo-Platonism acknowledged that. But which work was to be attributed to this One God? Creation or redemption? Or both? And if both, how could they be attributed to One God in a cultural context that was dominated by Neo-Platonic dualism? In order to reunite the work of creation and the work of redemption as the undertaking of one and the same God, the theologians and clerics, who adopted the Creed of Nicaea, established the unity of God in terms of the doctrine of the Trinity, but at the expense of the humanity of Jesus Christ. He is, as the revised form of the Creed asserts, "... the Son of God, begotten of the Father, only begotten, that is, from the being of the Father (ek tês ousias tou patros), God of God, Light of Light, true God of true God, begotten not made, of one substance with the Father (homoousion tô patri), through whom all things were made, things in heaven and things on earth; who for us men and for our salvation came down and was made flesh, and became a human being, suffered, and rose on the third day, ascended into the heavens, is coming to judge the living and the dead." 37 Not surprisingly, the christological problem remained unresolved, that is, the relationship between Jesus and the Christ, between his humanity and his deity -and, as an attendant consequence, the nature of the salvation he inaugurated. The effort to overcome the NeoPlatonic dualism that had conditioned earlier theologies and religious philosophies only aggravated the christological issue by identifying Jesus Christ ontologically with the Godhead by the usage of the hotly disputed philosophical terms: ousia (being) and homoousios (substance). But how is that descending movement from heaven to earth achieved, that is, from ek tês ousias tou patros (originating from the being of the Father) and homoousion tô patri (one substance with the Father) to "and was made flesh and became a human being"?
38 Is Phlp 2:7 presupposed? Did the descent involve a kenosis, an emptying of divine "being" and "substance"? Because the Creed said nothing about that, it begged the question of the union between the humanity and the deity within the historical person of Jesus of Nazareth.
Instead of uniting the church theologically, the Creed engendered greater alienation. A coalition was formed only a few years after its adoption, which resolved to eliminate the Nicene Creed from the confessions of the church on the ground that it was unbiblical. A new formulation was needed, if only to resolve the relationship of the two natures of Jesus the Christ and, hopefully, to restore the unity of the church.
4.
The Chalcedonian Creed Approximately 125 years later a new creed was codified at Chalcedon that was directed against all those who subverted the mystery of the incarnation by asserting two natures in Jesus before the union or by contending for only one after the union. 39 Ironically, however, the Chalcedonian Creed did not express the christological views of the majority of the bishops of the church. It was a formula imposed on them by the Emperor Marcian and Pope Leo in order to end the turbulence and disorder of the eastern church. While maintaining the adequacy of the earlier Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creeds, the Chalcedonian confession acknowledged:
"… one and the same Christ in two natures unconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably; nowhere is the difference of the natures annulled because of the union, but on the contrary the property of each of the two natures is preserved; each nature (physis) coming together into one person (prosôpos) and one actual being (hypostasis), not divided or separated into two persons, but one and the same Son and only-begotten, GodLogos." 40 In spite of its efforts to achieve an ecclesiastical compromise and political stability, the Chalcedonian formulation succeeded in resolving nothing. It was stigmatized by its own inadequacies and contradictions. 41 Each of the two natures, the divine and the human, remain separate in the union of the one person, Jesus Christ. No interpenetration occurs between them. The deity has not been absorbed into the humanity, and the humanity has not been drawn into the deity. Accordingly, the divine nature of the Christ could not be communicated to the humanity of Jesus; and, consequently, the christology of the Chalcedonian Creed lacked a soteriological orien-tation. As Harnack concluded, "The real mystery was thus shoved aside by a pseudomystery which in truth no longer permitted theology to advance to the thought of the actual and perfect union." 42 It was an empty confession, unable to unify the church by uniting the earthly Jesus to the heavenly Christ in an incarnation that took into account the kenosis of Phlp 2:7 and yet at the same time postulated a doctrine of redemption.
5.
Luther and Calvin More than a thousand years later Martin Luther, in his 1539 treatise, "On the Councils and the Churches," discussed what ecclesiastical councils can and cannot do by examining the first four ecumenical councils of Nicea (325), Constantinople (381), Ephesus (431) and Chalcedon (451). His review concludes with the judgment that "… they did not thereby establish any new article of faith." 43 "They set up nothing new, either in faith or good works, but rather as the highest judges, and greatest bishops under Christ, they defend the ancient faith and the ancient good works…" 44 Apparently Luther was unaware of the intrigue and manipulation involved in the creedal formulations of these councils. More significantly, however, he seems convinced that there is no discrepancy between the creeds of these councils and the christological witness of the New Testament.
"For these four articles are established far more abundantly and powerfully in St. John's Gospel alone, even though the other evangelists and St. Paul and St. Peter had written nothing about them, though all these, together with the prophets, teach them and testify mightily to them." 45 Luther's own christology, it would appear, was identical to these creedal codifications.
"We Christians must ascribe all the idiomata of the two natures to His Person. Christ is God and man in one Person. Therefore what is said of Him as man must also be said of 40 Ibid., IV, 220. 41 Pelikan offers an illuminating review of the problems and diverse points of view in "The Continuing Debate," The Christian Tradition, I, 266-277. 42 Ibid., IV, 223.
Him as God, viz., Christ died, and Christ is God, therefore God died; not God apart from humanity, but God united with humanity." 46 While this assertion seems to correspond to the Chalcedonian separation of the two natures within one person, Luther elsewhere acknowledged that the "idiomata of the two natures should also be united and mingled." 47 In that respect he moved beyond Chalcedon. Nevertheless, in view of his conviction that the first four ecumenical councils "established nothing new," it is clear that he was convinced the creeds coincide with the christological witness of the New Testament. For Luther, then, the Nicene Creed's identification of Jesus Christ with the second person of the trinity and attendantly its Neo-Platonically oriented attribution of homoousios to him in relation to God the Father are taught in the New Testament. Integrated into this christology was his "pleasant vision … of a blessed strife and victory and salvation and redemption:" "For Christ is God and man in one person, Who has neither sinned nor died, and is not condemned, and Who cannot sin, die or be condemned; His righteousness, life and salvation are unconquerable, eternal, omnipotent; and He by the wedding ring of faith shares in the sins, death and pains of hell which are His bride's, nay, makes them his own, and acts as if they were His own, and as if He Himself had sinned; He suffered, died and descended into hell that he might overcome them all. Now since it was such a one who did all this, and death and hell could not swallow Him up, they were of necessity swallowed up of Him in a mighty duel." 48 This interpretation of Jesus' saving work, however, required Luther to accentuate the deity of Jesus Christ. In contrast, his humanity is reduced to an "as if" historical reality: "[He] acts as if they [the sins, death and pains of hell] were his own, and as if He Himself had sinned." The historical Jesus, as in the creeds of Nicea and Chalcedon, is "swallowed up" by the Christ of God.
John Calvin, in his Institutes of the Christian Religion, expresses essentially the same perspective:
"His [Jesus] task was so to restore us to God's grace as to make the children of men, children of God; of the heirs of Gehenna, heirs of the Heavenly Kingdom. Who could have done this had not the self-same Son of God become the Son of man, and had not so taken what is ours as to impart what was his to us, and to make what was his by nature ours by grace? Therefore, relying on this pledge, we trust that we are sons of God, for God's natural Son fashioned for himself a body from our body, flesh from our flesh, bones from our bones, that he might be one with us. Ungrudgingly he took our nature upon himself to impart to us what was his, and to become both Son of God and Son of man in common with us." 49 As in the case of Luther, Calvin's Christology is oriented toward soteriology, and it is a soteriology that requires the accentuation of Jesus' deity. As intensely as the incarnation of the Son of God is stressed, Calvin was still theologizing within the Neo-Platonic dualism of the deity and the humanity of Jesus Christ, and within that dualism the weight naturally falls on the former. Mysteriously and wonderfully, he contends, "…the Son of God descended from heaven in such a way that, without leaving heaven, he willed to be borne in the virgin's womb, to go about the earth, and to hang upon the cross, yet he continuously filled the world even as he had done from the beginning!" 50 That the Son of God, in his incarnation, can remain sinless is attributable, according to Calvin, to the purity of Mary's "seed" and the sanctification of the God's Spirit.
"…if Christ is free from all spot, and through the secret working of the Spirit was begotten of the seed of Mary, then woman's seed is not unclean, but only man's. For we make Christ free of all stain not just because he was begotten of his mother without copulation with man, but because he was sanctified by the Spirit that the generation might be pure and undefiled as would have been true before Adam's fall." "On the other hand, we ought not to understand the statement that 'the Word was made flesh' in the sense that the Word was turned into flesh or confusedly mingled with the flesh. Rather, it means that, because he chose for himself the virgin's womb as a temple in which to dwell, he who was the Son of God became the Son of man -not by confusion of substance, but by unity of person. For we affirm his divinity so joined and united with his humanity that each retains its distinctive nature unimpaired, and yet these two natures constitute one Christ." 59 Jesus adopted this Son of David identity and was led by his vision of "the kingdom of God" to initiate a popular uprising that would result in his enthronement as the king of Israel. Reimarus divided Jesus' career into two time frames: the waiting period and the working period. The first is intimated by Mt 10:23: "You shall by no means have completed the cities of Israel before the Son of Man comes." By sending out his disciples to proclaim the good news of God's rule, Jesus expected the people to acknowledge his messiahship, join him in revolt and elevate him to kingship. When this did not materialize, he attempted to rally the people behind him by riding into Jerusalem on a donkey in fulfillment of Zch 9:9 and by enacting a temple reformation in defiance of the sacerdotal authorities. Instead he was arrested, tried, and handed over to the Romans for execution. His efforts to actualize God's rule by fulfilling the Son of David typology failed. His death marked the end of the "system of Jesus." There is no evidence that he intended to establish a new religion or a new confession of faith. Baptism was an innovation of his disciples, and the Lord's Supper should be identified as a Passover meal that celebrated the anticipated "kingdom" Jesus hoped to inaugurate.
Reimarus attributed the Christian movement to the mythologizing and theologizing of Jesus according to the other contemporaneous messianic expectation of Judaism, the eschatological trajectory of Jewish apocalypticism. Christianity, therefore, is the product of "the system of Jesus' disciples." By adopting the myth of resurrection, they invented the Easter event of his rising from the dead, but only after concealing his body and waiting fifty days for its decomposition. Other features were drawn from Jewish apocalypticism that gave rise to the attendant proclamation of his ascension into heaven and his imminent return to enact divine judgment. The scandal of his death on the cross was resolved by interpreting it redemptively as an act of substitutionary atonement.
The opposition between "the system of Jesus" and "the system of his disciples, which subsequently engendered the differentiation between "the Jesus of history" and "the Christ of faith," "…hung a mill-stone about the neck of the rising theological science of his time." source of truth. Lessing, who promoted the publication of various fragments of Reimarus' Apology, voiced this denigrating perspective: "Accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason." 61 For Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) history as an investigation of past events can never attain to objective validity, for it is dependent on testimony and not on immediate experience conceptualized by the categories of understanding. The resulting dichotomy between "event" and "truth," combined with the Enlightenment's view that the Bible simply illustrates the truths of natural religion already accessible to reason, emancipated biblical scholars and theologians to continue the quest without epistemo-logical or religious restrictions. Accordingly, the opposition between Jesus and the Christ, promoted in earlier times by Neoplatonism, now received its legitimation by Cartesian dualism and its reinforcement by Kantian epistemology.
David Friedrich Strauss (1808-1874), however, moved the quest in another direction by radicalizing.the historical problem in order to determine the historical foundation of the Christian faith. Compelled by Hegel's philosophical speculation to do what religion alone could not achieve, the reconciliation of the absolute opposites of the temporal and the eternal, he attempted to determine the extent to which universal truths were actualized in the history of Jesus. Is the particular person of Jesus of Nazareth necessary for the actualization of the idea of the unity between God and human beings in order to establish Christianity as the absolute religion? Since philosophy alone cannot deduce facts from history, empirical historical science must undertake that work by differentiating between myth and history. 62 Strauss' program to write a life of Jesus included the hermeneutics of the so-called "Mythical School," 63 Hegel's distinction between Vorstellung (representation) and Begriff (concept), and Hegel's dialectics. In contrast to Hegel, however, he identified Vorstellung with the mythical material in the Gospels and Begriff with the truths that the mythical material communicates, but divorced from all historical content. 64 Every event in the Gospels' account of Jesus is scrutinized dialectically with the aid of historical criticism. The supernaturalistic view is played off against rationalism, and the rationalist view against supernaturalism, with the result that they invalidate each other. Out of this mutual cancellation the predominance of the mythical in the life of Jesus emerges. 65 The gospel tradition, however, is not entirely reduced to myth. Many bits and pieces remain with which a sketch of the life of Jesus may be composed. Strauss himself, set free from dogmatism by philosophy, was untroubled by his negative results. Because he identified the mythical as the form or representation of the concepts and the concepts, apart from their historical character, as the truths, which the mythical conveys, he was able to retain an inner core of the Christian faith. It included: Christ's supernatural birth, his resurrection and his ascension, all of which he had distinguished as mythical. These are and remain eternal truths, in spite of the fact that their reality as historical facts are negated. Supernaturalism embraced a literalistic history of Jesus'ministry in the Gospels. Naturalism and rationalism threw out religious truth with historical fact. Strauss retained religious truth by discarding historical fact and ironically ended up maintaining the wedge between "event" and "truth." Within the epistemology of the Age of Enlightenment, God's incarnation in a particular human being, like Jesus of Nazareth, remained unthinkable. Jesus and Christ continued to be antithetical realities.
Ironically, the "first quest" was concluded by Albert Schweitzer. Like his predecessors, he attempted to reconstruct the life of Jesus on the basis of an historical criticism that, by its implicit identification of history with nature, presupposed a causal nexus that precluded divine intervention. Yet after reviewing the history of the entire enterprise, he found meaning in a mystical Jesus, independent of historical knowledge. The epistemology of Immanuel Kant may well have determined this reorientation, for it was after he had completed his first doctoral dissertation, subsequently published under the title, The Religious Philosophy of Kant from the "Critique of Pure Reason" to "Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason, that he turned to theology and specifically the problems of the life of Jesus. He wanted to solve the enigma of the Last Supper by exploring its development from "the faith of Jesus into the faith of primitive Christianity."
66 His investigation led him to conclude that for both Jesus and the earliest Christian community the elements of the meal had no symbolic representation of Jesus' body and blood. The supper was simply a celebration of the future "kingdom of God" and its attendant messianic banquet, represented by the bread and the wine, over which prayers of thanksgiving were spoken. "There is silence all around. The Baptist appears, and cries, "Repent, for the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand." Soon after that comes Jesus, and in the knowledge that He is the coming Son of Man lays hold of the wheel of the world to set it moving on that last revolution which is to bring all ordinary history to a close. It refuses to turn, and He throws Himself upon it. Then it does turn; and crushes Him. Instead of bringing in the eschatological conditions, He has destroyed them. The wheel rolls onward, and the mangled body of the one immeasurably great Man, who was strong enough to think of Himself as the spiritual ruler of mankind and to bend history to His purpose, is hanging upon it still. That is His victory and His reign." 68 Kantian epistemology prevented Schweitzer from acknowledging the authenticity of Jesus' resurrection from the dead, although that is the culminating reality of the eschatologicalchristological orientation that he attributed to Jesus. At the same time, it was the dualism of Kantian epistemology, specifically the shelter provided by the ahistorical realm of The Critique of Practical Reason that enabled Schweitzer to continue to identify himself as a disciple of Jesus.
The failure of Jesus' "eschatological fanaticism" 69 did not disillusion him; it did not detract from his personality nor cancel the validity of his world-denying ethics as the very essence of religion. 70 "He comes to us as One unknown, without a name, as of old, by the lake-side, He came to those men who knew Him not. He speaks to us the same word: 'Follow thou me!' and sets us to the tasks which He has to fulfill for our time. He commands. And to those who obey Him, whether they be wise or simple, He will reveal Himself in the toils, the conflicts, the sufferings which they shall pass through in His fellowship, and, as an ineffable mystery, they shall learn in their own experience who he is." 71 From within the epistemological perspective of Kant's practical reason Schweitzer was able to hear and obey Jesus' call to undertake a medical mission in Africa. From within that same perspective he was also able to pronounce a judgment that terminated what is now regarded as the first "Quest of the Historical Jesus."
"Those who are fond of talking about negative theology can find their account here. There is nothing more negative than the result of the critical study of the Life of Jesus." Is it his flesh-and-blood personhood or is it the Word that has become incarnate in him? 73 Is it the continuity with our being or is it the discontinuity he embodies as the enfleshment of the Word?
Kähler was by no means a docetist. He did not intend to establish a binary opposition between Jesus and the Christ. Incarnation was central to his understanding of "the biblical Christ of faith". He acknowledged the true humanity of Jesus and regarded it to be identical to ours. What distinguishes Jesus and establishes "an insurmountable barrier" between him and universally sinful humanity is his sinlessness. 74 This singular characteristic of Jesus' life, which Kähler insists must be taken into account in order to reconstruct "a fully authentic picture of Jesus" that is validated by the New Testament, defies the scientifically-determined presuppositions of historical criticism. Indeed, the empirical perspective of historical-critical theory and its foundational location in the Cartesian dualism of 'subject' and 'object' prevents any such oriented investigation from taking into account an idiosyncrasy like that of Jesus' sinlessness.
Kähler's attitude toward historical criticism, however, is inconsistent. While he rejects the adequacy of historical criticism in reconstructing the life of Jesus, he admits "that historical research can help explain and clarify particular features of Jesus' actions and attitudes as well as many aspects of his teaching."
75 If the Gospel traditions do not lend themselves to a discrete and certifiable differentiation between the historical realities of Jesus' life before his crucifixion and the ongoing process of interpreting his person and work that the Easter event inaugurated, how can historical criticism explain and clarify any features of Jesus' actions and attitudes? It seems that historical criticism must contradict its own methodological orientation by initially acknowledging the validity of Kähler's "historic biblical Christ of faith" and then proceeding with the historical investigation of its presentation in the New Testament Gospels.
Kähler, of course, is correct in his judgment that historical criticism cannot deliver what it seems to promise, namely the consummate knowledge that can establish the truth of the Christian faith. But his differentiation between "the so-called Jesus of history" and "the historic biblical Christ of faith" poses a dichotomy not unlike that of Kant's differentiation between empirical reason, the operational realm of historical criticism, and metaphysical reason, the operational realm of faith. "Historisch" or the historical, is the arena of human activity and interaction that requires critical investigation performed by a technical practice and supported by erudition. "Geschichtlich," the historic, according to Kähler, is identifiable with the enduring effect that a human being has on the subsequent course of history. 76 In the case of Jesus it was conveyed in a confession of faith that Paul delivered to the Corinthian Christians in 1 Cor 15: 3-5; and, as far as Kähler is concerned, nothing more is needed. For him the truth of the "geschichtlich" or the historic depends on the experience of conversion and the eyes of faith that it engenders. He reinforces this with an appeal to Mt 16:17 and 2 Cor 5:16
Although there are no explicit references to Kant's writings, Kähler did acknowledge that in his student days, "I swallowed down Spinoza and read Kant, Schelling, and Hegel." 77 His discrimination against "geschichtliche Tatsachen" (historical facts) and his advocacy of "Glaubenserlebnisse" (faith experiences) are inherently Kantian. "For historical facts, which scholarship must first clarify, cannot as such become experiences of faith; and therefore the history of Jesus and Christian faith separate like oil and water."
78
Of course, "the history of Jesus" is the Jesus reconstructed by historical criticism under the influence of the Cartesian split and reinforced by Kantian epistemology. That kind of historiography identifies history with nature and therefore imposes causality on its webs of continuity. But history is also the realm of possibility and freedom. As valid as Kähler's rejection of historical criticism was vis a vis its use in establishing of the truth of the Christian faith, his dichotomy of "the historical" and "the historic" continued the Age of Enlightenment's breach between Jesus and Christ as oppositional realities.
The shift away from "the historical Jesus" to "the historic biblical Christ," which Kähler inaugurated, was taken up by Rudolf Bultmann. Like Kähler he differentiated between Historie or objective history reconstructed by historians and Geschichte or history that is existentially significant for the present. 79 But through the influence of Wilhelm Dilthey and to some extent Martin Heidegger, 80 he repudiated the identification of history with nature and the subject-object split which that identification presupposed. Accordingly, in his essay, "The Problem of Hermeneutics," he states:
"If the concept of objective knowledge is taken from natural science (in which, moreover, it may also have become problematical today in the traditional sense), then it is not valid for the understanding of historical phenomena; for these are of a different kind than those of nature. They do not exist as historical phenomena at all, without the historical subject who comprehends them. For facts of the past become historical phenomena only when they become significant for a subject who itself stands in history and participates in it, only when they speak; and that they do only for the subject who comprehends them." 81 Like his renowned teacher, Wilhelm Herrmann, Bultmann oriented himself toward Christian faith as an event in the life of the believer instead of intellectual assent to the objective event of a historically reconstructed life of Jesus. "To believe in the cross of Christ does not mean to concern ourselves … with an objective event … but rather to make the cross of Christ our own, to undergo crucifixion with him." 82 Faith is a subjective experience that leads into freedom and the search for truth. But freedom, like faith, is bound to the domain of subjectivity, to Kant's Critique of Practical Reason; and, in view of their interdependence, they are not realizable in the realm of the cause/effect concatenation of nature.
In spite of Heidegger's influence during the 1920's at the University of Marburg, Bultmann remained deeply committed to a Kantian or Neo-Kantian perspective. Its epistemological orientation was compatible with his Lutheran faith, especially its doctrinal differentiation between justification by works and justification by faith. These tenets are oppositional realities, like nature and grace, or Historie and Geschichte, or like the title of his Gifford Lectures, History and Eschatology. To these dualities Bultmann added the contrast between the indicative, the realm of facts, and the imperative, the realm of the will. The former is the province of objectification; the latter is the sphere of encounter. 83 In an ever-threatening world dominated by its powers and principalities, existential security and the certitude of faith can only be experienced in the subjective sphere of encounter. Knowledge produced by human reason, with its formulation of universal principles and laws, belongs to the realm of objectification. As a foundation for faith it is to be negated as unconditionally as justification by works.
It was from the Marburger Neo-Kantians, Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp, Bultmann derived the notion of "objects," not as the initial referent of thought, but "as the stated goal or end of thought." 84 Objects are the formation of consciousness. "To know is to objectify in accordance with the principle of law." 85 Accordingly, for Bultmann knowledge that is established by this process of objectification is characteristic of the domain of "works" and of law. 86 His appropriation of this Neo-Kantian position is expressed in the opening sentence of his essay, Welchen Sinn hat es von Gott zu reden?
If one understands to speak "of God" to be equivalent to speaking "about God," such speech has no sense at all, for in that moment in which it occurs, it has lost its object, God. … God cannot be spoken about in universal statements, in universal truths which are true without a correlation to the concrete existentialistic situation of the speaker." 87 Any and every attempt to speak "about God" by the objectification of human reason is sin in its negation of the "I -Thou" relationship with God. In the same vein, faith is not determined by nor based on facts about the historical Jesus. Bultmann, therefore, could undertake a radical form-critical investigation of the Synoptic tradition without any fear of how his faith would be affected by its results. For him the Jesus that could be recovered or reconstructed by historical criticism was identifiable with what the Apostle Paul had designated "Christ according to the flesh". Or, in Bultmann's terminology, it is nothing more than the "dass" (that), that is, the fact of Jesus' career and therefore, only the presupposition of the Christian faith. 88 Yet Bultmann did write Jesus and the Word, or in German simply Jesus. It is not, however, a life of Jesus that was typical of the nineteenth century quest of the historical Jesus. It is not oriented toward Historie but Geschichte; it is not interested in facts extracted from the Gospel tradition by a process of objectification. It is his "highly personal encounter with history," 89 based on the oldest layer of the Synoptic tradition. He claims it is "objective, for it refrains from pronouncing value judgments;" 90 but at the same time the teaching of Jesus, which is the focus of the book, is interpreted existentially.
"The words of Jesus … meet us with the question of how we are to interpret our own existence. That we be ourselves deeply disturbed by the problem of our own life is therefore the indispensable condition of our inquiry." 91 by the New Testament writings and their witness to Jesus Christ. Although he utilized the ontology of Heidegger's Dasein for his program of demythologization, as he designated it, in order to reinterpret the mythology of the Gospel, his Neo-Kantian dualism continued to be the epistemological framework within which he worked.
"…the figure and work of Jesus Christ must be understood in a manner which is beyond the categories by which the objective historian understands world-history, if the figure and the work of Jesus Christ are to be understood as the divine work of redemption." 92 "In faith I deny the closed connection of the worldly events, the chain of cause and effect as it presents itself to the neutral observer. I deny the interconnection of the worldly events not as mythology does, which by breaking the connection places supernatural events into the chain of natural events; I deny the worldly connection as a whole when I speak of God. I deny the worldly connection of events when I speak of myself, for in this connection of worldly events, my self, my personal existence, my own personal life, is no more visible and capable of proof than is God as acting." 93 Bultmann was an heir of the Age of Enlightenment. He lived and labored within the Cartesian split of subject and object as it was reinforced by his radical appropriation of Kantian dualism, and, therefore, the sum total of his work may be evaluated as nothing more than an abortive enterprise in apologetics. He affirmed the truth of revelation while the history in which it occurred was ultimately denied.
9.
The New Quest or the so-called Second Quest of the Historical Jesus What, then, is the continuity between the earthly Jesus and the proclaimed Christ? Both Reimarus and Schweitzer, the beginning and end of the first quest, had denied continuity. The Christ that had been formulated by Jesus' disciples and the subsequent Christian movement was pure fabrication. Martin Kähler, on the other hand, had rejected the entire enterprise of the quest, contending that the biblical picture of the historic Christ is the personal unity of the suprahistorical revelation of God and historical reality of Jesus. In contrast, Bultmann acknowledged a minimal continuity. Jesus must be regarded as the precondition of the Christian movement. But it is the mythology of the Christ that the Easter faith generated which is the bearer of the truth of the Gospel? And it is that mythology of the Christ that Bultmann attempted to re-interpret for the modern world.
Is such a minimal continuity between the earthly Jesus and the proclaimed Christ adequate for the establishment of the historical character of God's revelation in the life and work of Jesus of Nazareth? To use Bultmann's language, is Jesus only the "dass," the historical proclaimer of the imminent reality of God's rule, who became the proclaimed as a result of his post-Easter identification with the Messiah and "the Son of Man"? Must the Jesus, whose life and teaching are reconstructed by historical-critical scholarship, be dismissed as "the Christ according to the flesh"? Surprisingly, it was from within the Bultmann School that a new quest, or what is now being designated as the second quest, originated. It was not, however, simply a re-opening of the earlier quest. The "either/or" character of that quest, that is, the opposition between the historical Jesus and the Christ that necessitated a historical and/or theological choice between the two, was considered to be invalid. Out of a realization that "the historical reality of revelation itself [was] endangered because "the Christ of faith" had virtually lost his historical rootedness, Ernst Käsemann, was motivated to pioneer a new quest.
"The heart of our problem lies here: the exalted Lord has almost entirely swallowed up the image of the earthly Lord and yet the community maintains the identity of the exalted Lord with the earthly." 94 "To state the paradox as sharply as possible: the community takes so much trouble to maintain historical continuity with him who once trod this earth that it allows the historical events of this earthly life to pass for the most part into oblivion and replaces them by its own message." 95 In spite of the skepticism that Form Criticism had evoked, Käsemann believed that the small fund of knowledge about the historical Jesus that had been constituted could be enlarged by employing the same "radical criticism". By utilizing Jesus' parables as formal criteria, more authentic Jesus material could be identified on the basis of the principle of dissimilarity.
"In only one case do we have more or less safe ground under our feet; when there are no grounds either for deriving a tradition from Judaism or for ascribing it to primitive Christianity, and especially when Jewish Christianity has mitigated or modified the received tradition, as having found it too bold for its taste." 96 Presupposed in this enterprise of enlarging the fund of knowledge about the historical Jesus in order to establish continuity between Jesus and Christ is his differentiation between "mere history" (bruta facta) and interpreted history. "Mere history is petrified history whose historical significance cannot be brought to light simply by verifying the facts and handing them on. …In theological terms, this means that only in the decision between faith and unbelief can petrified history even of the life of Jesus become once again living history. This is why we only make contact with this life history of Jesus through the kerygma of the community." 97 In other words, early Christianity rendered the brute facts of Jesus' life meaningful to faith by a process of interpretation that Käsemann called "an 'historification' of mythical material." 98 Evidently Käsemann, like his Age of Enlightenment predecessors, was operating within the framework of the Cartesian subject/object split and therefore assumed that historical events are essentially brute facts which require interpretation in order to achieve understanding. But, as Heidegger demonstrated, understanding is necessarily prior to interpretation and is projected into experience, whether of texts or the events of daily life in order to complete the hermeneutical circle of understanding. There is no such thing as mere history. There are no brute facts except perhaps those that are isolated from a historical sequence or structured whole; and even then they are theory laden. Interpretation without prior understanding is impossible. The projection of the pre-understanding continues consciously and unconsciously throughout life; and in that process both disclosure and concealment occur. The structure of consciousness will open as well as close the possibilities of truth that are latent in the actualities of experience. But that process is conditioned by the social construction of reality. What is disclosed and what remains concealed will be predetermined by the paradigm of reality that has structured the preunderstanding.
Accordingly, it is invalid to assess the memories of Jesus' ministry that his disciples carried into the future and re-evaluated in the light of the Easter event as "brute facts". What his activity and teaching disclosed to them will never be known, unless perhaps particular contemporaneous ideological trajectories can be identified which Jesus embraced and which he rejected. If there is any continuity between "the Jesus of history" and "the Christ of faith," it should manifest itself in the relationship between the ideo-logical trajectory with which Jesus identified himself and the subsequent eschatological and christological formulations of early Christianity.
All too quickly the second quest of the historical Jesus faded into oblivion. 99 Its virtue consisted in its efforts to establish continuity between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith. This is also implicit in Günther Bornkamm's monograph, Jesus of Nazareth, the first endeavor of the second quest to produce "a life of Jesus" or more correctly a critical reconstruction of Jesus' preaching and teaching.
100 Like Käsemann he recognized that Jesus cannot be understood apart from the reality of Easter and the early Church's theologizing of Jesus and his own eschatological interpretation of his ministry. But like Käsemann he also presupposed that facts are prior to interpretation and therefore differentiated between the "undistorted, primary facts" of the life of Jesus and the subsequent "pious interpretation" of the early Church. Significantly, however, he substituted the earlier eschatological difference between the futuristic orientation of John the Baptizer and the imminent presence of God's rule that Jesus had manifested in his deeds and words in place of Bultmann's attribution of the eschatological shift of the ages to the theologizing of the Apostle Paul. Yet, like Bultmann, he acknowledged Jesus to be the proclaimer who becomes the proclaimed. But he recognized that such traditions as Mt 5:21-22, 28, 33-37 and the claim to authority, which they express, distinguish him as more than a rabbi or even a prophet. That same authority was manifested in the immediacy of the sovereign power he exercised in his works of healing and exorcism.
"In each case a world has come to its end, be it for salvation or judgment. Its past is called into question. Its future is no longer secure -that future towards which it has been moving, according to all those traditions and laws which had been valid until then. In this sense its "time" has ended. 101 Here it is also obvious that he followed Bultmann in maintaining a paradoxical relationship between the future and the present in Jesus' teaching and in interpreting the terms "world" and "the kingdom of God" existentially.
For Bornkamm the continuity between Jesus and the Christ was established by the Easter event which validated him and his eschatological interpretation of his ministry as the eschatological event and in turn inaugurated the process of eschatological-christological confession and proclamation in and by the early Church.
10.
The so-called Third Quest of the Historical Jesus Lives of Jesus continued to be published during the 1960's and '70's even into the early '80's, but without the ideological perspective of the so-called second quest. 102 Establishing continuity between the historical Jesus and the Christ of faith was not a critical objective. Nor has it been a critical objective of the so-called third quest of the historical Jesus. New methodology and newly discovered sources characterize this latest quest. This is especially true of John Dominic Crossan's 507-page monograph, The Historical Jesus: The Life of a Mediterranean Jewish Peasant.
Crossan begins with thirteen pages of "a reconstructed inventory" of Jesus' sayings drawn from the four Gospels and the recently discovered Gospel of Thomas. They are metaphorically characterized as "a score to be played," "a program to be enacted;" and the book he is writing is professed to be "an account of their inaugural orchestration and initial performance" by the historical Jesus. 103 The book itself, Crossan's account of Jesus' performance, is a very impressive piece of work. In many ways it justifies the opening of a still another quest. Unlike the participants in the first quest, Crossan does not presuppose that the historical Jesus and the Christ of faith (encountered in the Gospels) are mutually exclusive polarities. Although he does not appear to be motivated by the objective of the second quest, he concludes toward the end of his investigation: "I find, therefore, no contradiction between the historical Jesus and the defined Christ, no betrayal whatsoever in the move from Jesus to Christ."
